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Several reasons take Argentina and Brazil to have a keen interest in climate change issues. 
First, both countries rely heavily on agricultural production to sustain livelihoods and their 
economies at large. In recent years unusual extreme weather events have occurred in most 
Southern Cone countries, leading to increases in flood frequency and forest fires, loss of 
biodiversity, increases in plant diseases, reduction in dairy cattle production and problems 
with hydropower generation (IPCC, 2007). Despite uncertainty as to the distribution of the 
effects of climate change across regions and sub-regions, there is widespread consensus 
that areas of Argentina and Brazil will experience increasingly frequent heavy rains and 
floods, rising sea levels will disrupt vulnerable coastal zones and high drought-risk areas 
may face even drier conditions in the future. These factors threaten to cause severe changes 
in ecosystems and human society, including sharp agricultural productivity falls in some 
regions and steep rises in others (De la Torre et al, 2008).  
Second, adaptation to the effects of climate change will demand sizable financial resources 
to adjust infrastructure and to deal with the consequences of extreme weather events upon 
production environments.3 Since part of these adaptation resources will be contributed by 
developed countries based on the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”, 
Argentina and Brazil fall in the category of potential recipients. However, as developing 
countries with comparatively high per capita incomes they are unlikely to be among top 
recipients of adaptation funds. Thus, while the demand for adaptation will most probably be 
significant, international aid is likely to remain comparatively modest. In contrast, the 
potential of Brazil as a source of cheaper mitigation efforts is significant. In effect, as the 
fourth largest emitter of greenhouse gases (GHG) and depository of one of the world´s 
largest tropical forests, Brazil has an important contribution to make in global initiatives to 
mitigate climate change.4 Continued deforestation of South America’s tropical areas will 
have significant global implications, as standing forests play a key role both as absorbers of 
greenhouse gases and as carbon reservoirs. This makes Brazil a prime target for mitigation 
commitments, but it also opens the door to reaping the benefit of international mechanisms 
to promote efficient mitigation. Argentina has a much lower potential to contribute to 
global mitigation efforts, and consequently to benefit from mitigation funds, but it could 
also profit from the experience gained and the instruments used by Brazil.  
Third, some industrial countries have adopted (and are most likely to continue to adopt) 
unilateral measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Some of these measures will have 
an effect on the region as they will impact international trade flows in carbon-intensive 
products. Sector policies aimed at reducing emissions from international aviation and 
maritime transport may also affect Argentina and Brazil due to their relatively distant 
location from industrial country consumer markets. Additional consequences may be borne 
out of the enforcement of new regulations and standards, both mandatory and voluntary, to 
promote a low carbon economy and discourage long-distance travel. 
                                                
3 If no action is taken to slow down climate change, in the next few decades climate-related disasters could 
cost Latin America US$300 billion per year (Swiss Re, 2002 in IPCC, 2007). 
4 If members of the European Union are taken separately, Brazil is the third largest emitter when land use 
change is included in the calculation. Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) Version 7.0. (Washington, 
DC: World Resources Institute, 2010). 
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Despite these common challenges faced by Argentina and Brazil, they have not encouraged 
closer cooperation on climate change policies and international negotiations. This paper 
tries to account for this record, reviewing the evolution of national policies, identifying 
some of its determinants and exploring potential future commonalities. Apart from this 
introduction the paper is organized in five sections. The next one gives a broad picture of 
underlying determinants of national climate change policies by briefly examining Argentine 
and Brazilian emission profiles. The next two sections review the evolution of climate 
change policies and both countries’ changing priorities in international climate change 
negotiations. The fourth section identifies some issues that may offer opportunities for 
bilateral cooperation in the future. The paper ends with a brief concluding section. 
 
1. Underlying conditions: Argentine and Brazilian emission profiles 
According to 2005 data South America is responsible for 10 percent of global GHG 
emissions, with about 50 percent of them attributable to land-use change and forestry (see 
Table 1). These aggregate figures are decisively influenced by Brazil, the largest emitter in 
the region and the fourth largest in the world. Since the share of total global emissions is a 
proximate indicator of the domestic political and economic sensitivity of climate change 
issues, these figures help to account for Brazil’s long-standing activism in this policy area. 
Brazil’s comparatively high share of total world emissions has made it a primary target for 
emission reduction commitments in the developing world and, at the same time, a 
significant potential beneficiary of market instruments to encourage mitigation. Argentina, 
by contrast, occupies the 28th place in the world emission ranking and contributes with less 
than one percent of total global GHG emissions.  
On closer inspection, Argentine and Brazilian emission matrices also look quite different. 
While Argentina’s per capita emissions are slightly higher than the world average, those of 
Brazil are significantly higher when land-use change is included. In effect, the weight of 
land-use change and forestry in each country overall emission pattern contrasts sharply: 
whereas it accounts for 64 percent of total emissions in the case of Brazil, it explains only 9 
percent of Argentina´s. This helps to account for the different sensitivity that forest issues 
have historically had in domestic policy debates and national bargaining positions.  
The different composition of emissions also account for contrasting trends in total 
emissions’ growth: in effect, in the 2000-05 period Brazil’s total emissions’ growth was 
only 0.3 percent per year, whereas Argentina’s reached 1.5 percent (including land-use 
change). If land-use change is excluded both countries experienced very similar rates of 
total emissions’ growth (1.6 and 1.5 percent, respectively), suggesting that the relatively 
good performance of the first indicator in the case of Brazil was largely accounted for by 
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The GHG intensity of the Argentine economy (when excluding land-use change) is also 
higher than in Brazil. This is explained by Argentina’s higher per capita energy 
consumption and higher carbon intensity of energy (hydropower makes a large contribution 
to total electricity generation in Brazil). As Table 2 shows, Argentina and Brazil differ 
considerably in the relative weight of energy in total emissions: when land use change is 
excluded, the energy sector accounts for 50.4 percent of total emissions in Argentina, as 
compared to 34.2 percent in Brazil. The difference is largely accounted for by electricity 
and heat, other fuel combustion and fugitive emissions. Compared to the world average, 
both countries show a lower contribution of the energy sector to total emissions. This is 
particularly the case of Brazil, where that contribution is close to half the world average.5   
Recent estimates for Brazil indicate that the general patterns reviewed in this section 
remain unchanged (Viola, 2009). The rate of emissions in Brazil is reported to have peaked 
in 2004 and fallen since as a result of government policies to halt deforestation in the 
Amazon region.6 In the case of Argentina, the rate of emissions from the energy sector has 
probably increased due to a higher share of thermal sources in total electricity generation.  
 
                                                
5 The difference is more marked if land-use change is considered, given the large share of total Brazilian 
emissions accounted for by that source. In the case of Annex I countries, energy related emissions account for 
85 percent of total emissions. 
6 According to Viola (2009), emissions experienced a slight increase in 2007 as a result of deforestation to 




GHG Emissions by sector, 2005 
 South 
America 
 Brazil  Argentina  World  
 MtCO2e % MtCO2e % MtCO2e % MtCO2e % 
Excluding land use change: 
  Energy 
  Industrial processes 
  Agriculture 









































Including land use change: 
  Energy 
  Industrial processes 
  Agriculture 
  Land-use change & forestry 

















































Note: Includes CO2,	  CH4,	  N2O,	  PFCs,	  HFCs,	  SF6 




2. Climate change policies in Argentina and Brazil 
Argentina and Brazil are at different stages in the development of climate change-related 
policies. Although Viola (2009) has characterized Brazilian climate change policies as 
ambiguous, defensive and under-resourced, they compare favorably with those of other 
countries of the region. In effect, in the last decade Brazilian climate change policies seem 
to have experienced substantial dynamic adaptation, accompanied (and probably preceded) 
by a more vocal and engaged civil society. As one indicator, in 2009 Brazil became the first 
South American country to enact a climate change law. Argentina, by contrast, still has not 
developed an overarching policy framework to deal with climate change. Similarly, the 
government shows loose inter-agency coordination in this policy area and implements 
piecemeal initiatives only partially aimed at reducing GHG emissions. 
 
2.1. Brazil: slow but consistent. 
Launched by Presidential Decree No. 3515 (2000), Brazil started to develop national 
climate change policies more a decade ago. However, it was only in December 2008 that a 
National Climate Change Plan was adopted (Brazil 2008a). In between, the Executive 
implemented piecemeal initiatives void of a broader encompassing framework. Indeed, 
some policies that may be presently related to climate change objectives were in place well 
before Presidential Decree No. 3515. Most of them did not target lower emissions but 
enhanced energy security. These policies included the ethanol biofuel program and, less 
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remarkably, the PROCEL (Electrical Energy Conservation Program) and PROINFA 
(Incentives for Renewable Energy Sources) initiatives.7   
The Brazilian bio-ethanol program is a good example of a long-term policy triggered by 
factors others than climate change, but which gradually became a major component of 
Brazilian climate change policies and a key asset in international negotiations. The program 
was originally launched to lower dependence on foreign fossil fuel after the first oil shock. 
In the meantime, it contributed to reduce GHG emissions and became a major component 
of Brazilian climate change diplomacy. The ethanol program combined large public sector 
subsidies with mandatory blending requirements, federal loans, tax exemptions and tax cuts 
for bio-fuels and flex-fuel automobiles.8  
At first cautiously, Brazil also adopted policies to protect forests and curb illegal 
deforestation, which not only reduces the capacity for GHG absorption but also contributes 
significantly to total emissions (see section 1).9 In 2004 an Action Plan for Prevention and 
Control of Legal Amazon Deforestation (PPCDAM) was implemented, targeted at reducing 
deforestation rates. Two years later, a legal framework to manage public forests was 
officially launched, to be followed by a Sustainable Amazon Plan (PAS) and the creation of 
the Amazon Fund. The Amazon Fund was established to manage donations for non-
reimbursable investments to prevent, monitor and combat deforestation, and to promote the 
preservation and sustainable use of forests in that region. Brazil also adopted an ecological-
economic zoning strategy for sugar cane production (Zoneamento Ecológico-Econômico – 
ZEE), to prevent sugar cane from expanding into the Amazon and the Pantanal and Alto 
Paraguai watershed, moving ahead of foreign demands to ensure that sugar-based ethanol 
does not encourage deforestation and biodiversity degradation (Decree Nº 6.961, 2009). 
Forest issues have always been sensitive for Brazilian climate change negotiators: initially 
dominated by concerns over the exercise of sovereign rights in the Amazon, the issue has 
gradually evolved towards the upgrading of enforcement capabilities and the tapping of 
international resources.  
Apart from China and India (which respectively account for 60.2 and 11.7 percent of Clean 
Development Mechanism –CDM- projects), Brazil has been one of the most active 
participants in the market. In effect, Brazil hosted 5.8 percent of total projects, committing 
average annual reductions of 21 million tons of carbon-dioxide equivalent (CO2e)10. 
Argentina, by contrast, has only 1.2 percent of the CDM market and a strikingly lower 
number of projects (17 as compared to 172 in Brazil). Aside from the size asymmetries 
between the Brazilian and Argentine economies (which translate into more cost effective 
opportunities for emissions’ reduction in Brazil), the difference in the number of projects 
can also be attributed to the fact that 65 percent of Brazilian CDM projects are financed 
                                                
7 The PROCEL and PROINFA programs were targeted at reducing waste of electrical power on both the 
supply and consumer side and creating a compulsory market for renewable energy to be fed into the national 
electricity grid. 
8 Brazil introduced bio-fuels blending requirements applicable to the domestic transport market (25 percent 
bio-ethanol in gasoline and 4 percent bio-diesel in diesel fuel). Flex-fuel automobiles, which run on any 
combination of gasoline and bio-ethanol and accounted for more than 80% of total automobile sales in 2009, 
are a domestic technological development. Morgera et al, 2009, p. 86. 
9 According to official sources, deforestation would be responsible for 40.1 percent of expected Brazilian 
emissions in 2020. http://www.mma.gov.br/estruturas/182/_arquivos/cenarioemissoes_182.pdf 
10 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change CDM projects database, May 2010. 
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domestically. Availability of domestic finance enables Brazilian firms to sell their carbon 
credits at a higher value –once emission reductions are certified– rather than at the earlier 
stage of project design (Government of Brazil 2008b, p. 82). 
As mentioned before, only in 2008 the government adopted a National Climate Change 
Plan, at the time presented as an instrument to integrate and harmonize climate change 
policies. The Plan identified Brazil’s major challenges, such as the need to significantly 
reduce emissions from land-use change and continuously increase efficiency in the use of 
natural resources. The plan also set seven specific objectives and main actions to achieve 
them. Many, however, were largely declaratory. Major targets included maintaining the 
high share of renewable energy sources in electricity generation, encouraging the 
sustainable increase in the use of bio-fuels in national transportation, and reaching zero 
illegal deforestation and eliminating the net loss of forest coverage by 2015 (Government 
of Brazil, 2008a). In this particular area the Plan marked a major shift of Brazilian domestic 
policies, which had traditionally been relatively tolerant of (or unable to curb) illegal 
logging activities and deforestation. By setting targets to curb illegal deforestation and stop 
the net loss of forest coverage, Brazil not only placed itself as a top candidate to attract 
climate-related funding for forest activities, but it also adopted a proactive stance consistent 
with its long-standing opposition to international conditionality or oversight of forest-
related policies.  
The National Climate Change Plan was followed by Congressional approval of a Climate 
Change Law N. 12,187 in December 2009.11 The Climate Change Law, an Executive 
proposal submitted in 2008, set out a national strategy for GHG emissions’ reductions and 
was passed by Congress just the day after the end of the Copenhagen meeting. The new 
legislation aims at decoupling GDP and GHG emissions growth, committing Brazil to an 
expected reduction in emissions of 36.1-38.9 percent compared to the projected pathway to 
2020. The Law creates a Brazilian Market for Emission Reduction (MBRE) and lists other 
climate policy instruments, such as the Climate Change Fund, a plan to prevent and control 
of deforestation and other policies (including subsidies and other measures) to promote a 
reduction in GHG emissions. The law mandates other mitigation and adaptation actions at 
the sector level with a view to move towards a low carbon economy. Sector initiatives, to 
be enforced by executive decree, have raised concerns in the private sector, particularly 
industry. The implementation of the law will largely rest on regulations to be later on 
issued by the Executive. 
The Climate Change Law also listed the federal entities in charge of dealing with climate 
change policies, including the Inter-ministerial Committee on Climate Change (Decree No 
6263, 2007), the Inter-ministerial Commission on Climate Change, the Brazilian Forum on 
Climate Change (FBMC) (Decree s/n 28 August 2000), the Brazilian Network on Global 
Climate Change and the Coordinating Commission on Meteorology, Climatology and 
Hydrology. The FBMC is a multi-stakeholder advisory forum chaired by the President of 
Brazil that includes 12 ministers, the director of the National Water Agency and civil 
                                                





society representatives or individuals appointed by the President.12 The Inter-ministerial 
Committee on Climate Change is composed of 17 federal bodies and the FBMC.13  
On the basis of the Climate Change Law, in 2010 the Brazilian government submitted to 
the UNFCCC a letter containing a plan to reduce emissions through “national appropriate 
mitigation actions” (NAMAs), detailing the types of activities to be undertaken and the 
expected reductions in GHG emissions to be reached as compared to business-as-usual 
projections. These include actions on forests and land use, improvements in energy 
efficiency, more intensive use of bio-fuels, an increase in the supply of hydroelectric power 
generation and the use of alternative energy sources (including the replacement of coal 
from deforestation with coal from planted forests in the iron and steel industry). 
 
2.2. Argentina: not an issue yet. 
Unlike Brazil, Argentina has not yet adopted a coherent national climate change policy, 
although it complies with most UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
commitments, such as the submission of national communications on GHG emissions and 
inventories (Argentina’s last report is from 2000 and the third one is currently under 
preparation). The Secretary of Environment is the implementing authority for the UNFCCC 
and its Kyoto Protocol (Decree 2213/2002)14 and the Argentine Office for the Clean 
Development Mechanism (“Oficina Argentina del Mecanismo para un Desarrollo Limpio”) 
is the designated national CMD authority (Resolution 240/2005).15 This office is integrated 
by a Permanent Secretary, an Advisory Committee, and an inter-ministerial Executive 
Committee bringing together representatives of the secretaries of energy; agriculture; 
industry, commerce and mining; transport; economy; foreign relations, international trade 
and worship; and science and technology. However, Argentina does not have a framework 
regulation on sector policies and, as it was originally the case in Brazil, energy security 
considerations have been the main driver behind the emphasis on bio-fuels and renewable 
energy sources. 
Argentina has adopted legislation to promote renewable sources of energy in electricity 
production and the use of bio-fuels in transportation. Law 26.190 (2007) established a 
Promotional Regime to Use Renewable Sources of Energy for Electricity Generation and 
set a national target of 8 percent of renewable energy in the national energy consumption 
matrix by 2018. This commitment was based on the target for renewable sources of energy 
adopted at the 2004 Bonn Conference on Renewable Energies (Morgera et al, 2009). 
Argentina is also in the process of implementing a mandatory 5 percent blending 
requirement for bio-fuels in the transport sector and it has approved a promotional policy 
for the use of renewable sources of energy for electricity production.16 Argentina also 
                                                
12  Brazilian Forum on Climate Change. www.forumclima.org.br 
13 The Inter-ministerial Committee on Climate Change was the agency in charge of designing the national 
climate change plan.  
14 Decree 2213/2002. Available at: 
http://ambiente.gov.ar/?aplicacion=normativa&IdNorma=689&IdSeccion=29 . 
15 Resolution 240/2005. Available at: http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/100000-
104999/104189/norma.htm . 




adopted a Native Forests Environmental Protection Law (Law N. 26.631, 2007), which 
established a moratorium on deforestation until each federal district adopts land-planning 
strategies contemplating protection of forest biodiversity hot spots.  
Institutions dealing with climate change issues in Argentina have no formal coordination 
mechanism and policy responsibilities are spread out among several ministries and the 
Secretary of Environment. The latter recently convened a ‘Governmental Committee on 
Climate Change’ to steer the preparation of Argentina’s Third National Communication 
and to encourage institutional coordination among federal government agencies.17 This 
Committee meets regularly and brings together fifteen federal agencies including relevant 
ministries and secretaries as well as the National Institute for Agricultural Technology 
(INTA), the Federal Environment Commission (COFEMA), the National Atomic Energy 
Commission (CONEA), and the National Space Activities Commission (CONAE).  
Argentina has not yet presented NAMAs to the UNFCCC or associated itself with the 
Copenhagen accord. The series of sector policies mentioned above, however, could be 
translated into NAMAs for UNFCCC purposes. In fact, a letter by the Environment 
Secretary to the UNFCCC dated 15 February 2010 identified some mitigation measures 
already taken by Argentina (most adopted as a result of energy security concerns), but it did 
not formalize the country’s support of the Copenhagen accord.18 The list includes energy 
efficiency measures encouraging lower consumption of electricity and natural gas included 
in the National Program for Efficient and Rational Use of Energy (Decree 140/07); Law 
26,473 banning the sale of incandescent light bulbs as from 31 December 2010; several 
national programs on energy efficiency; Law 26,190 on Renewable Energy granting 
subsidies for renewable energy sources; Law 26,093 on bio-fuels blending requirements; 
Law 26,331 on land planning for sustainable management of native forests and Law 26,432 
promoting investments in the forestry sector; and a national plan for integrated waste 
management funded by the World Bank.  
As compared to Brazil, Argentina’s smaller scale of emissions means that the country has 
not experienced intense pressures to adopt mitigation measures. Thus, aside from the need 
to foster renewable sources of energy due to energy security considerations, the promotion 
of climate change-friendly policies have not had a sense of urgency. This has been probably 
reinforced by a more limited participation of stakeholders from civil society in the domestic 
policy debate. 
 
3. Argentina and Brazil: shifting places in international climate change 
negotiations? 
Historically, Brazil and Argentina have been at odds in climate change negotiations. In 
particular, both countries have followed separate tracks within the UNFCCC process based 
mostly on differences in their emission sources and their relative status as global emitters. 
Whereas Brazil, as a relatively large player, has had a loud voice almost from the beginning 
of negotiations, during some periods Argentina tried to compensate its modest leverage 
with an activist international diplomacy. These roles showed clearly during the Kyoto 
                                                
17 For more information visit: http://www.ambiente.gov.ar/?IdArticulo=8661 
18 Letter to the UNFCCC Executive Secretary, dated 15 February 2010. 
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Protocol negotiations, when Brazil joined India and China to lead the Group of 77 in 
successfully opposing any binding emission reduction commitments by developing 
countries (Viola, 2009),19 while Argentina tried to play the role of a broker between the 
developed and developing world. Argentina chaired the Committee of the Whole that 
drafted the text of the Kyoto Protocol and its main negotiators worked to reach a 
compromise between North and South. After the Protocol’s signature in 1997 Argentina 
hosted a Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC in the following year, seeking to 
bring the US back to the negotiating table by proposing the adoption of voluntary 
commitments by developing countries. The offer was strongly opposed by other developing 
parties and eventually abandoned after the Buenos Aires COP.  
Brazil, in turn, has a long history of involvement in environmental negotiations that date 
back to the Rio Conference of 1992. That country has traditionally been a key player with a 
strongly defensive approach. Although Brazilian environmental and climate change policies 
have been subject to much internal debate, for all their complexity they have remained 
primarily shaped by the perception of Brazilian vulnerability due to the size of its economy 
and emission trends, and by the need to defend sensitive interests in the Amazon region. As 
a result, Brazil has consistently opposed any binding commitments on the part of 
developing countries in the context of climate change negotiations. It has also opposed any 
international agreement on forests in other fora, like the Convention on Biodiversity and 
the UN Forum on Forests. These positions have remained virtually unchanged until very 
recently, as they were firmly rooted in Brazil’s interest to maintain national discretion in 
regulating forest activities in the Amazon region.  
Brazil’s present support for reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries 
(REDD), however, suggests a process of gradual change: while opposing any kind of 
international commitment on forests, Brazilian negotiators have supported the development 
of international mechanisms to finance national actions to prevent deforestation. The key 
concept is that REDD or the Amazon Fund may support national actions already under 
implementation, rather than imposing binding commitments on a top-down basis. Through 
this gradual process of change, without altering its core position and principles (such as the 
opposition to binding commitments on emission reductions or forest management), 
Brazilian negotiators have shown some flexibility and offered new negotiating space for an 
agreement in post-Kyoto protocol negotiations. 
The gradual smoothing of Brazilian traditionally defensive stance in international 
negotiations has also been facilitated by the evolution of domestic climate change policies. 
Although Brazil has stayed close to India, China and South Africa (the BASIC group of 
heavyweight developing countries that shaped the outcome at Copenhagen and 
counterbalanced the influence of the United States and the European Union), it emerged as 
the coalition member most amicable to industrialized countries’ demands. After 
Copenhagen, this was confirmed by Brazil’s adoption of national emission reduction 
targets, its swift submission of NAMAs in January 2010 and its ambitious bilateral 
cooperation with the US on bio-fuels. These attitudes have been encouraged by stronger 
enforcement capabilities and new expectations that Brazil is set to gain from the transition 
to a low-carbon economy and successful negotiations on topical issues such as REDD in a 
                                                
19 Eventually, this strong stance was given as a factor behind the US Congress refusal to ratify the Protocol. 
For an analysis of the Brazilian negotiating stance, see Viola (2009). 
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post-2012 climate regime. In contrast to past concerns about sovereignty in the Amazon, a 
vision seems to have gradually emerged that sees the climate regime as an opportunity to 
mobilize international finance (Curtin, 2010). Along these same lines, Brazil made several 
presentations backing its proposal for a fund to channel resources to countries that 
demonstrate reduced emissions from deforestation.20  
Argentina, by contrast, has sharply diminished its visibility in the negotiations and largely 
abandoned its role as a broker. The Argentine president was one of the few leaders absent 
from the Copenhagen meeting, said to have been one with the highest presidential 
participation outside UN headquarters in history. Similarly, the difference in the size of 
delegations and the experience and political weight of Argentine and Brazilian climate 
change negotiators in Copenhagen provide clear evidence of the policy priority of the topic 
in each domestic polity. For Argentina climate change negotiations do not seem to be a 
priority issue in itself, but rather a policy arena to be pragmatically used to further global 
foreign policy goals.21 By the time of writing Argentina had not yet given its support to the 
Copenhagen Accord, which has been backed by more than 110 countries including all 
major emitters. In practice, Argentina and the ALBA group are among the few countries 
(jointly with traditional opposing blocs such as OPEC) that remain outside of the 
agreement.22 
The emerging picture is one where Argentina and Brazil have been gradually shifting their 
allegiances, while at the same time remaining in separate groups. Argentina has shown a 
dramatic shift from being almost an ally of the US during the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, 
to appearing in tacit support of Venezuela and others in Copenhagen.23 The Brazilian 
negotiating stance, by contrast, has moved away from its predominantly defensive approach 
in a direction more consistent with the construction of a global climate change regime. This 
gradual evolution turned Brazil into the most cooperative member of the BASIC group of 
developing countries in Copenhagen.  
                                                
20 Documents: FCCC/SBSTA/2006/MISC.5, FCCC/SBSTA/2007/MISC.2, FCCC/SBSTA/2007/MISC.14. 
Brazil also served as co-chair of the working group dealing with land-use, land-use change and forestry issues 
(LULUCF) in the Copenhagen Conference, showing readiness to actively participate in forest-related 
discussions (Akanle, et al, 2009). 
21 “La Cumbre de Copenhague fue un fracaso por culpa de los países desarrollados” Gacetilla de Prensa de la 
Secretaría de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sustentable. Available at: 
http://cop15.ambiente.gob.ar/?aplicacion=noticias_filtrado&idarticulo=8635&idseccion= 
22 During the Copenhagen Climate Conference, the Argentine and Venezuelan delegates spoke in support of 
each other on several occasions. In contrast, Argentina and Brazil were not reported to have publicly shared 
positions. (Daily reports and summary of the Copenhagen Meetings by the Earth Negotiations Bulletin, IISD, 
2009 available at: http://www.iisd.ca/climate/cop15/). 
23 The group of ALBA-PTT nations, including Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Venezuela were 
amongst the most vocally opposed to the adoption of the Copenhagen Accord, arguing lack of participation 




4. Argentina and Brazil: is cooperation feasible? 
Argentine and Brazilian different emission patterns lay behind their traditionally divergent 
standing in climate change negotiations and the poor record of bilateral cooperation. 24 
However, both countries also share common challenges and may benefit from policy and 
technical cooperation in some areas. One such area is that of identifying common 
vulnerabilities and adaptation demands, which will require extensive technical work. 
Climate change models are not constrained by national borders and regional adaptation 
needs may involve territories pertaining to several countries. In such cases bilateral or 
regional cooperation would make sense. However, so far technical and scientific 
cooperation has been basically the result of the initiative of the scientific community, with 
very little input from the public sector. In 2009 the MERCOSUR environment ministers 
agreed to undertake a joint study on adaptation vulnerabilities and an Ad hoc Group on 
Climate Change (GAHCC) was given the task to draft its terms of reference, which are still 
under preparation.25 But aside from this isolated initiative, MERCOSUR has not been a 
forum for regional or bilateral cooperation on this topic. One reason may be that negotiators 
do not need the institutional and political infrastructure of MERCOSUR to interact, since 
climate change negotiators from Argentina and Brazil have plenty of opportunity to do so 
in climate change meetings. However, identifying opportunities for regional cooperation is 
unlikely to be done in multilateral fora. 
Another sensitive area that may be susceptible of common bargaining principles is that of 
fossil fuel subsidies. Argentina and Brazil are both part of the G-20 that adopted the 
Pittsburgh Declaration by which countries agreed to phase out and rationalize over the 
medium term inefficient fossil fuel subsidies, since they “encourage wasteful consumption, 
reduce energy security, impede investment in clean energy sources and undermine efforts 
to deal with the threat of climate change.”26 Although negotiations on this issue are at an 
initial stage and governments are considering the mechanism and methodology to report 
fossil fuel subsidies, Argentina and Brazil may coordinate their positions to make sure that 
the definition of subsidies does not imply the dismantling of safety nets for the poor in 
developing nations or exclude other methods of support frequently used by industrial 
countries, such as incentives for offshore oil exploration (Aguilar, 2009). 
Another area is the negotiations on environmental goods and services (EGS) within the 
World Trade Organization. These negotiations were launched following a Doha 
Development Agenda mandate to “reduc(e) or, as appropriate, eliminate(e) tariff and non-
tariff barriers to environmental goods and services”27. Since 2001 countries have been 
working on elucidating the meaning of EGS, including climate-friendly goods, and on how 
to deal with dual use products (which depending on their use, may or may not serve 
                                                
24 Ríos and Veiga (2010) also point out that cooperation in this area will require issue-based variable 
geometry coalitions.  
25 During the X Meeting of Mercosur Ministers of the Environment (Montevideo, September 2009) a project 
was presented on the elaboration of a Mercosur strategy on regional vulnerability and adaptation to climate 
change to be financed by FOCEM (Fondo de Convergencia Estructural del MERCOSUR) with technical 
cooperation by the UN Economic Comission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
26 Leaders’ Statement The Pittsburgh G-20 Summit, September 24 – 25 2009. 
27 Doha WTO Ministerial 2001: Ministerial Declaration, Document WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, November 2001. 
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environmental objectives) (Aguilar, 2008). Argentina and Brazil have opposed the adoption 
of a single list of products as proposed by industrial countries, but they have submitted 
alternative negotiating proposals. Brazil has proposed engaging in request-offer rounds 
(similar to tariff negotiations) or, alternatively, using a “basket” approach as a second-best 
option, under which each Member would offer tariff cuts on a set of environmental goods.28 
Argentina, initially with India, proposed an “integrated approach” whereby countries would 
first define “categories” of environmental activities useful to combat climate change (e.g. 
renewable energy, solid and hazardous waste management and air pollution control), and 
then identify goods that could be used in national projects (such as wind turbines, solar 
water heaters, biogas production tanks, and methane collection liners). Developing 
countries would reduce/eliminate tariff and non-tariff barriers when the goods in question 
were used in projects undertaken under the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM).29 Despite these differences, Brazil and Argentina are on the 
developing country side of the debate and share interests in balancing the set of highly 
industrialized goods proposed by developed countries for liberalization. In particular, Brazil 
has a strong interest in including bio-ethanol in any prospective EGS list.30 Argentina has 
less of a problem regarding bio-fuels because its main export, bio-diesel, is not as heavily 
taxed with tariffs as bio-ethanol. In July 2010, Argentina and Brazil made a common 
presentation on the need to give developing countries more flexibility in liberalizing 
environmental goods and services through a set of criteria on special and differential 
treatment. This proposal seeks to provide space to protect domestic ‘green’ technology 
industries.31 
Unilateral measures undertaken by industrial countries may also trigger closed cooperation 
between Argentina and Brazil. In effect, mechanisms to price carbon emissions, subsidies 
and regulations (both mandatory and voluntary) can affect the location of production and 
trade. According to Peters and Hertwich (2008) Argentina and Brazil are both net exporters 
of carbon emissions, which makes the two countries potentially vulnerable to measures 
aimed at promoting less carbon intensive production. One such mechanism would be the 
implementation of carbon border adjustment measures, considered in US Congress 
proposed legislation and also possible in the EU 2020 program. According to Aguilar, 
Bouzas and Molinari (2010) manufacturing products most likely to be subject to carbon 
adjustment measures in the US and the EU contribute with 7 and 14 percent of total 
Argentine and Brazilian exports to those markets, respectively. These categories account 
for only 3.3 and 0.4 percent of percent of total Brazilian and Argentine exports (Table 3), 
but for a quarter and a fifth of total manufacturing exports to the world. 
 
                                                
28 “Environmental Goods For Development.” World Trade Organization Committee on Trade and 
Environment Special Session (WTO CTESS) Document TN/TE/W/59, 8 July 2005 (Version 2007) in WTO 
CTESS Document JOB 07/146, 1 October 2007.  
29 “The Doha Round and climate change. Submission by Argentina” Document TN/TE/W/74, 23 November 
2009.  
30 The list of 43 goods identified by the World Bank as relevant for climate change mitigation does not 
include bio-ethanol. 
31 “Communication from Argentina and Brazil. Environmental Goods and Services, Paragraph 31(iii), Special 
and Differential Treatment.” World Trade Organization Committee on Trade and Environment Special 




Argentina and Brazil: Climate change sensitive manufacturing exports, 2006-08 
 Exports as a share of total Brazilian exports to 
(percentage) 
Exports as a share of total Argentine exports to 
(percentage) 
 United States EU World United States EU World 
Sensitive 
manufacturing sectors 
18.7 11.1 3.3 15.4 3.1 0.4 
   Iron and steel  12.3 5.6 1.9 4.8 1.8 0.1 
   Aluminium 1.4 2.1 0.4 5.4 0.6 0.1 
   Paper and pulp 2.7 2.9 0.7 1.3 0.3 0.6 
   Chemicals 1.4 0.2 0.2 2.8 0.1 0.1 
Source: authors’ calculations based on BADACEL. 
 
Both countries are also vulnerable to climate change standards and regulations, such as 
energy efficiency and emission intensity requirements. The potential impact of these will 
depend on industrial organization features and on how these standards are implemented 
(Aguilar, Bouzas and Molinari, 2010). In some sectors, however, regulations are very likely 
to have sizable effects on trade. One case in point is bio-fuels, which are expected to 
increase substantially their share in total fuel consumption (particularly in transportation) in 
the developed world. Most programs to encourage production and use of bio-fuels (such as 
mandatory blending requirements, tax incentives and minimum prices) have been made 
conditional to “sustainability criteria” that include, for example, minimum savings in GHG 
emissions. Implementation of these criteria will rest on estimation methods that may render 
substantially different results. One case in point was the enforcement of the US Renewable 
Fuels Standard, where the Environmental Protection Agency initially found that bio-ethanol 
from sugarcane did not meet the criteria to qualify as an “advanced bio-fuel”. By using 
alternative estimation techniques, Brazilian producers were able to make bio-ethanol 
qualify. EU estimates also consider that bio-diesel produced from soybeans do not meet the 
minimum required standard of 35% of GHG savings to qualify as a sustainable bio-fuel, 
which would threaten Argentine exports to that market. However, the EU estimate does not 
take into consideration the positive effect of no-tillage methods on emissions of greenhouse 
gases.  
Voluntary private sector labeling schemes may also turn out into a common concern for 
both countries. Some retail chains have introduced “carbon footprint” labeling requirements 
and others have adopted questionable labeling procedures (such as “food-miles”) to provide 
information about how much a product has travelled from the point of production. Apart 
from the misleading information on greenhouse gas emissions provided by labeling 
schemes such as food-miles, these mechanisms may become important obstacles to 
international trade (particularly in the food sector), due to their sensitivity to alternative 
estimation methodologies. Active participation in the process of standardization could thus 





We have argued that Argentina and Brazil are in different stages in the development of 
their climate change-related policies. On balance, Brazilian policies have gradually evolved 
from a strongly defensive stance towards a more cooperative approach, turning Brazil into 
the most amicable of the BASIC group of developing countries. This has been the result of 
a gradual but consistent development of domestic climate change policies, increased 
awareness of the potential benefits of a climate change regime for a relatively large emitter 
like Brazil and a perception of diminished vulnerability to foreign pressure. In Argentina, 
by contrast, climate change policies have not climbed to an important place in the policy 
agenda. Partly as a result, environment (and climate change) bargaining positions seem to 
have followed broader foreign policy alignments rather than clearly identified “national 
interests” on this particular policy area. 
This has translated into divergent paths in climate change negotiations. Whereas Argentina 
tried to act as a broker between developed and developing countries during the Kyoto 
protocol negotiations, Brazil maintained a hard-line defensive stance. In contrast, in the 
post-Kyoto era Brazil seems to be emerging as the most amicable member of the BASIC 
group of large developing countries, while Argentina lost visibility and tacitly aligned itself 
with the anti-Copenhagen hard-liners. Unlike Brazil, Argentina has not yet assumed any 
emission reduction objectives or offered any NAMA’s within the UNFCCC process that 
followed the Copenhagen meeting.  
These differences are partly accounted for by different emission profiles, which in turn 
have given climate change-related issues a different statute in domestic policy debates and 
international negotiations. However, despite these structural differences both countries may 
find commonalities in a number of areas. We have identified four policy areas that may be 
subject to closer cooperation: technical and scientific research on the potential impact of 
climate change and adaptation needs; the regulation of fossil fuel subsidies; the definition 
of environmental goods and services; and the response and preparedness to deal with 
unilateral measures in the industrial world. Argentina and Brazil share a common interest in 
showcasing that emission reductions in these countries are much likely to succeed by 
targeting the agricultural sector –and reducing deforestation and improving agricultural 
techniques– rather than by imposing barriers (carbon border adjustments or otherwise) to 
industrial goods. Mitigation measures targeting industrial sectors in industrialized countries 
are not necessarily effective for countries like Argentina and Brazil, where the largest and 
most effective mitigation potential lies in agricultural, land-use and forestry sectors. Both 
countries may also cooperate to make sure that the standards and regulations adopted by 
industrial countries are WTO-compatible and to prepare to cope with the technical 
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